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Abstract
Should events be conceived of as primitive or should they be decomposed into
more basic elements with certain syntax? This talk presents new evidence for the
latter view: If events are represented as contradictory propositional meanings repre-
senting their pre- and post states, a uniform analysis of certain eventive and certain
too- comparative constructions is possible; this is wanted given striking parallels be-
tween the two types of structure. The analysis goes some way, among other, toward
explaining ‘repetetive/restitutive’ asymmetries familiar from eventive constructions
(von Stechow 1996) but similarly arising in too- comparative constructions.
1 Introduction
1.1 Events as primitives or as pre- and post states
The assumption of Davidsonian variables makes for a simple representation of the logical
form of natural language sentences encoding events. Accepting quantif cation over events,
a sentence like Otto f ew a spaceship to Mars can be translated into a logical form as in
(1):
(1) ∃e & f ight(e) & with-spaceship(e) & to-Mars(e) & PAST(e)
The format in (1) immediately tells us what entailments the sentence as a whole gives rise
to – (1) simply entails the conjuncts it is made up of. If there are event variables, the ease
with which we appear to talk about events as well as refer to them with anaphora is no
mystery, and so on (see, e.g., Casati and Varzi 1996).
This paper does not develop alternative means to arrive at the virtues connected to the
assumtion of event variables just mentioned (but see e.g. Condoravdi and Beaver 2004).
Its purpose is to add evidence to the view that events are not primitive but have a certain
decomposable structure, similar to what has been proposed by authors like von Wright
1965 or Dowty 1979. According to these authors, events are really composed of states
connected by operators. Abstracting from detail, Otto f ew a spaceship to Mars looks as
in (2) on the decompositional approach:
(2) ∃t,t’ ¬ AT(Mars, Otto, spaceship, t) & AT(Mars, Otto, spaceship, t’) & t’ > t
∗I would like to thank Magdalena Schwager and Ede Zimmermann who helped me get clearer about
scopal issues. Shortcomings are my responsibility.
In: Emar Maier, Corien Bary & Janneke Huitink, eds. (2005) "Proceedings of SuB9"
www.ru.nl/ncs/sub9
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A famous argument that the representation of events should be as in (2) and not as in
(1) comes from patterns with the presupposition triggering adverb again. In eventive
predications, againmay trigger a presupposition that the event as a whole occurred before
or that merely the ‘resultant state’ held before. These are the repetitive and restitutive
readings respectively that again may give rise to, cf. (3) (presuppositional meanings are
written in spaced type where this enhances readability). Note the ‘certain’ below (3-b) –
it is the same door talked about in the assertion that f gures in the presupposition triggered
by wieder under the restitutive reading:1
(3) Otto closed a door again
a. there was an earlier door-closing repetitive
b. there was a certain closed door earlier restitutive
The reading that again gives rise to is syntactically conditioned, as can be seen with
its German counterpart wieder. If wieder occurs to the left of the direct object in an
agentive structure, only a repetitive reading is available. If it occurs to the right of the
direct object, it naturally triggers a restitutive reading as well (the repetitive reading being
hardly available in this particular case).
(4) a. Otto
Otto
hat
has
wieder
again
eine
a
Tu¨r
door
geschlossen
closed
there was an earlier door-closing repetitive
b. Otto
Otto
hat
has
eine
a
Tu¨r
door
wieder
again
geschlossen
closed
there was a certain closed door earlier restitutive
Von Stechow 1996 offers an analysis of the pattern just illustrated. According to it, the
presupposition that wieder triggers is computed on the basis of its c-command domain;
in structures like (4-a), wieder has in its scope the structure encoding both the pre- and
the post state of the event in question; in structures like (4-b), it has in its scope only the
structure encoding the event’s post state.
The Davidsonian approach to event representation has nothing to say about the repeti-
tive/restitutive pattern, simply because it does not represent pre- and post states seperately
– there are only events as a whole on the Davidsonian approach.
1.2 Argument and Plan
1.2.1 too-comparatives
Comparison involves looking at different things or states of affairs. In the case of too-
comparatives, the two things or states of affairs cannot be part of the same situation.2
Consider an example:
(5) Otto found the water too warm.
1It seems to be possible for quantif ers, therefore, to bind variables occurring in presuppositions. Cf.
Brandt (to appear) for some discussion of related issues.
2We use the term too-comparative also for constructions involving (not)... enough.
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Interpreting (5) involves looking at a non-actual situation; roughly, (5) conveys that the
water is warm to a degree d that is above (or below, if we use not...enough) a degree d’
such that if the water were warm to degree d’, it would be appropriate for Otto’s purposes
(cf. von Stechow 1984 and Meier 2003 on the counterfactuality of too-comparatives). For
too- comparatives, it is obvious that their interpretation involves reference to incompatible
situations (e.g., something cannot be both acceptably warm and too warm at the same
time).
If it can be shown that the structure of too- comparative constructions is like that of even-
tive constructions, the decompositional approach to event representation is supported. The
decompositional approach says that the linguistically relevant representation of events is
in terms of pre- and post-states holding at different times. This is just the obvious for-
mat for the representation of too- comparatives, widening the concept of times to indices
(situations/‘worlds’) at which certain states of affairs hold and abstracting from the unidi-
rectionality of time.
1.2.2 Constructions and scope of again
The point of the paper is to argue that repetitive/restitutive asymmetries familiar from
eventive constructions arise in a parallel fashion in too- comparative structures. Consider
(6) and (7), exemplifying the ‘dative experiencer construction’ that will be the focus of
investigation here and illustrating the kind of asymmetry we are interested in:
(6) a. ...weil
...because
wieder
again
einem
a
Warlord
warlord-DAT
Millionen
millions
in
in
die
the
Finger
f ngers
kamen
came
b. ...weil
...because
einem
a
Warlord
warlord
Millionen
millions
wieder
again
in
in
die
the
Finger
f ngers
kamen
came
‘...because a warlord got hold of millions again’
(7) a. ...weil
...because
wieder
again
einem
someone-DAT
das
the
Wasser
water
zu
too
warm
warm
war
was
b. ...weil
...because
einem
someone-DAT
wieder
again
das
the
Wasser
water
zu
too
warm
warm
war
was
‘because someone found the water too warm again’
Considering f rst the eventive case in (6), the intuitive difference between (6-a) and (6-b)
is this: for (6-a) to be felicitous, a presupposition has to hold that an event of a warlord
getting hold of millions occurred before. There has to be a warlord that went from poor
to rich at an earlier time. For (6-b), in contrast, it is enough if there is an earlier time at
which a warlord had millions – the warlord in question could have been born rich, for
example. In structures like (6-b), only the post state of an event of a warlord getting hold
of millions is presupposed.
We argue that the contrast between (7-a) and (7-b) is parallel. At this point, the difference
can be described as follows: for (7-a) to be felicitous, there has to have been someone
at an earlier time whose standard regarding water temperature (and some purpose) was
exceeded by the actual water temperature. This individual can be different from the one
involved in the actually asserted meaning. For (7-b), in contrast, the prominent reading
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is that there is an individual whose standard is such that it was exceeded by the water
temperature at an earlier time and is exceeded by the water temperature at a later time (the
‘assertion time’) as well. In (7-a), wieder takes scope over the standard of the individual
in question as well as over the degree to which the individual actually experiences the
water temperature. In (7-b), in contrast, the individual talked about in the presupposition
and assertion appears to remain constant (but cf. section 4 below for qualif cation): there
is an individual with a certain standard regarding water temperature (and some purpose),
and this standard is exceeded at an earlier as well as at a later time.
Just as wieder in eventive constructions may take scope over pre- and post states or just
post states, it may take scope over standards and actual degree instantiations or just over
actual degree instantiations in too- comparative structures. This is expected if at the rel-
evant level of representation, pre-states in eventive constructions correspond to standards
in comparative constructions, and post-states correspond to actual degree instantiations.
1.2.3 Overview
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents the constructions that will
be the empirical focus of investigation and brief y summarizes the main aspects of their
analysis developed elsewhere (Brandt 2003, to appear). Section 3 introduces a simple
representational format that will be suitable for the purpose here. The format is developed
with simple (but non-transparent) comparative constructions for illustrative purposes, it
is then shown how it applies to the productively occurring (and more transparent) too-
comparative and eventive constructions in focus. Section 4 comprises the analysis of
repetitive/restitutive asymmetries in both types of construction. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
I have argued earlier that there is a particular ‘cipient predication’ structure that is shared
by a range of productively occurring constructions typically featuring dative arguments
in German (Brandt 2003, to appear).3 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on
constructions as given in (8).
(8) a. Otto
Otto-DAT
ist
is
die
the
Suppe
soup-NOM
*(zu)
(too)
salzig
salty
‘Otto f nds the soup too hot’
b. Otto
Otto-DAT
ist
is
die
the
Suppe
soup-NOM
*(zu
(to
Boden)
ground)
gefallen
fallen
‘The soup fell to the ground to Otto’s misfortune’
Example (8-a) illustrates the too- comparative construction, (8-b) illustrates the eventive
construction. I will not review here in any detail the arguments leading to the view that
(8-a) and (8-b) indeed share a common structure. At core, the constructions share a dative
subject (‘cipient’) with analagous properties; they further comprise a theme and a (degree)
location argument, presence of the latter being a necessary condition for the licensing of
3See the summary and review of my dissertation that appeared in GLOT 7:9/10 for quick reference.
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the dative subject, as the examples already indicate. The structure I have argued to underly
both (8-a) and (8-b) is given in (9).
(9) tP
XP
cipient
t
t YP
Y VP/AP
D/NP
theme
V/A
V/A PP/DegP
PRO
theme
P/Deg
P/Deg
to(o)
ZP
the garden
much
The main idea behind (9) is that cipient datives are licensed as subjects of particular
predicates. The core properties of the predication structure are the following:
• the VP/AP encodes a propositional ‘thingatloc’ meaning, corresponding to there
being something at a certain location
• a presupposition is projected from the VP/AP predicate that corresponds just to the
negation of thingatloc
• the category ‘little t’ establishes a predication relation between the predicate and the
dative cipient subject – it abstracts over a variable for the cipient to bind (a super-
location of the (degree) location argument) and existentially closes the thingatloc
meaning
• the dative cipient argument accommodates (‘binds’) the presuppositional meaning
projected from the predicate.4
A feature of the analysis that is important here is that the (degree) location argument is
def nite with respect to the cipient, acting as the subject of predication. This is most
obvious in the case of the too- comparative structure, consider (10-a) vs. (10-b):
(10) a. Die
the
Suppe
soup
ist
is
zu
too
salzig
salty
4Merger of the cipient argument therefore leads to a fully interpretable structure. Combined with Chom-
sky’s 1999 proposal that structure that can be interpreted must not be kept in syntax, this gives a basic expla-
nation of why the theme argument situated in VP/AP cannot enter local syntactic relations (the traditional
‘A-relations’) with material situated above the cipient. Cf. the references cited.
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b. Die
the
Suppe
soup
ist
is
dem
the
Otto
Otto-DAT
zu
too
salzig
salty
‘Otto found the soup too salty’
Interpreting (10-a) involves comparing the actual degree to which saltiness is experienced
to a standard that comes with the utterance situation: the actual degree of saltiness is above
a certain degree (range) def ning appropriate saltiness (regarding soup and some purpose)
– it is the speaker or a group comprising the speaker that def nes what the appropriate
degree is. In (10-b), in contrast, it is the cipient referent that def nes appropriate saltiness
– the standard needed to interpret the too- comparative comes with the cipient referent.
Similarly (but harder to pin down) in the eventive construction:
(11) a. Die
the
Suppe
soup
f el
fell
zu
to
boden
ground
‘the soup fell to the ground’
b. Die
the
Suppe
soup
f el
fell
dem
the
Otto
Otto-DAT
zu
to
boden
ground
‘the soup fell to the ground to Otto’s misfortune’
The location at which the soup ends up in (11-a) is def ned with respect to some loca-
tion set in the utterance context; it could be the location of an aforementioned agent or
container but also e.g. the location of the speaker. In (11-b), it is the cipient that sets the
location with respect to which the location at which the soup ends up is def ned; in the
usual case (abstracting from telekinesis and the like), it will be a location on the cipient
referent’s vertical axis.
It is crucial for the discussion to follow that the meaning amounting to the actual (degree)
location of the theme is encoded below the cipient, in fact below the theme that binds a
PRO element in the PP/DegP respectively; therefore, the PP/DegP already comprises all
the variables involved in the ‘thingatloc’ meaning.
The negated thingatloc meaning, projected from the predicate, is available only at the
stage where the cipient is merged – it is the cipient that anchors (or binds) the negated
thingatloc meaning (cf. section 3.2 for elaboration).
It is, in sum, the part of structure comprising the cipient that encodes the complete event
(a change from ‘not: theme at location’ to ‘theme at location’) and the comparison as a
whole respectively (‘not: theme at (degree-) location’ to ‘theme at (degree-) location’).
3 Representation
3.1 Wieder
Taking events to be made up from pre- and post-states, the repetetive and restitutive read-
ings associated with wieder can be represented as follows:5
5Less perspiciously but more explicitly, the repetitive and restitutive readings respectively look as fol-
lows:
(i) a. ∃t,t’,t”,t”’ ¬p(t”’) & p(t”) & t”’ < t” & t”’,t” ⊂ ET & ¬p(t’) & p(t) & t’ < t & t’,t ⊂ LT
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(12) wieder/again:
a. ET: ¬p(t”’) & p(t”) & t”’ < t” & LT: ¬p(t’) & p(t) & t’ < t repetitive
b. ET: p(t”) & LT: ¬p(t’) & p(t) & t’ < t restitutive
If wieder applies to a structure encoding a complete event, it triggers a presupposition
that at an earlier time, a change from a state of not p to a state p occurred. If it applies to
a structure just encoding the post-state of an event, it triggers a presupposition that at an
earlier time, the post state of the event held.
3.2 Too- comparatives
If I sayMir ist schlecht (Me-DAT is sick, ‘I feel sick’), I assert that the degree of sickness
that I experience is above some standard of well-being, call it ‘sickness standard’. Taking
d’ to be the degree to which I actually experience sickness and d my sickness standard,
we have:
(13) ∃d’, dstandard d’ > dstandard
If I sayMir ist wieder schlecht (‘I feel sick again’), I assert the above and commit myself
that there was an earlier time where I felt sick as well. A short way of writing this is (14):
(14) ET: ∃d’, dstandard & d’ > dstandard & LT: ∃d’, dstandard d’ > dstandard
Standards determining what is appropriate with regard to some property, thing instantiat-
ing that property (and purpose in question) are different for different individuals; however,
we do not take standards as associated with particular individuals to change at unreason-
able rates. Our expectations are that standards that individuals have are stable. Therefore,
(14) can be written as follows under normal circumstances:
(15) ∃dstandard & ET: ∃d d > dstandard & LT: ∃d’ d’> dstandard
There are a range of superf cially simple predicates licensing dative cipients in German
(and similarly in a variety of languages); these predicates usually speak about bodily
and/or sense experience (being sick, being hot/cold, tasty, (un)pleasant)
Arbitrary scalar predicates productively license the construction under investigation to
the extent that a degree element like too or (not...) enough is involved – the degree ele-
ment makes it explicit that we are talking about exceeding (or not reaching) individuals’
standards with respect to some thing, property and purpose. As far as the semantics is
concerned, I assume that nothing changes. Thus a too- comparative like the water was
too warm has truth conditions as sketched in (16):6
(16) The water was too warm
∃dstandard,d’ & AT(water,dstandard,i) & AT(water,d,i’) & d > dstandard & i > i’
b. ∃t,t’,t” p(t”) & t” ⊂ ET & ¬p(t’) & p(t) & t’ < t & t’, t ⊂ LT
6We now write i for ‘index’ instead of t for ‘time’ as in the eventive case. The ordering can be taken to
correspond to preferability.
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There are duals in the domain of comparison; all of the following express that the actual
degree of warmth diverges from what we call the standard:
(17) a. the water was too warm
b. the water was not cold enough
c. the water was too cold
d. the water was not cold enough
All of (17) license the cipient construction; it does not matter whether the actual degree
exceeds the standard or vice versa. The condition relevant for cipient licensing is simply
that the standard and the actual degree diverge. More generally, we can therefore write
the portion of meaning mattering for cipient licensing as two contradictory meanings, one
corresponding to the standard and one to the actual instantiation:
(18) dstandard: ¬AT(x,d,i)
dactual: AT(x,d,i’)
The cipient def nes the range of degrees of potential property instantiation, the degrees
to which the pertaining individual can experience the instantiation of some property (its
‘quality space‘ (Quine 1960)); in particular, the cipient determines the standard with re-
spect to which comparison takes place. For brevity, we write the individual that deter-
mines the degree range and standard as an index on the d variable. Reminding us that
standards are more or less f xed over time for particular individuals, the interesting por-
tion of meaning a sentence like Dem Otto war das Wasser wieder zu warm (‘Otto found
the water too warm again’) translates into can be written as in (19):
(19) ∃x ¬AT(water, dx,i) & ET: AT(water,dx,i) & LT: AT(water,d’x,i)
The eventive cases we are talking about are unaccusatives with location arguments. A
sentence like Dem Otto kamen Millionen in die Finger (‘Otto got hold of milions’) trans-
lates into (20), where l ranges over locations (associated with the cipient, written again as
an index on the location variable).
(20) ∃x ¬AT(millions,lx,i) & AT(millions,lx,i’) & i < i’
Depending on whether wieder takes scope over both the pre- and the post-state or just the
post state, we get (21-a) or (21-b) respectively:
(21) a. ∃x ET: ¬AT(millions,lx,i) & AT(millions,lx,i’) & i < i’
& LT: ¬AT(millions,lx,i’’) & AT(millions,lx,i”’) & i” < i”’
b. ∃x ET: AT(millions,lx,i) & LT: AT(millions,lx,i’)
3.3 A note on presupposition, wieder and negation
Under the analysis presented here, the different readings that wieder gives rise to depend
on whether or not it has in its scope the dative cipient argument that accommodates the
negated thingatloc meaning, projected from the VP/AP as a presupposition.
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That wieder may indeed take scope over meanings that have themselves presupposi-
tional status can be seen in the following examples featuring the aspectual verb anfangen
(‘start’):
(22) Er
he
hat
has
wieder
again
angefangen
started
seine
his
Frau
wife
zu
to
schlagen
beat
‘He started beating his wife again’
a. ET: he went from not beating his wife to beating his wife & LT: he went
from not beating to beating his wife
b. ET: he beat his wife & LT: he went from not beating his wife to beating his
wife
Aspectual verbs like start or stop presuppose that what is started or stopped has not been
(start) or has been (stop) the case before. Wiedermay trigger a reading according to which
there was an earlier starting or stopping (going from p to ¬p or v.v.) or just a reading
according to which what is started or stopped was (not) the case before. Interestingly,
negation appears to help to get the ‘narrow’ reading:
(23) Er
He
hat
has
nicht
not
wieder
again
angefangen
started
seine
his
Frau
wife
zu
to
schlagen
beat
a. ET: he beat his wife. LT: he did not go from not beating his wife to beating
his wife
The ‘repeated starting’ reading does not appear to be excluded in (23); however, the nat-
ural reading that (23) has is the one according to which the action that was started was in
process at an earlier time.
It is well known that negation creates islands, e.g. for the scope of existential quantif ers
that are otherwise amazingly free as respects scope taking (cf. Reinhart 1997). Negation
appears to have a scope-trapping effect on wieder as well.
4 Repetitive/Restitutive asymmetries
In section 3 above, a simple format for representation of the readings that wieder gives
rise to was developed. Still earlier in section 2, the cipient structure was sketched, the im-
mediately relevant point being that the actually asserted thingatloc meaning (loc standing
for locations as well as degrees) is encoded in the VP/AP while the negated thingatloc
meaning corresponding to the pre-state and standard respectively is associated with the
cipient argument.
This section is devoted to showing that repetitive/restitutive readings with wieder arise in
the eventive and comparative structure in an analogous fashion. A problem is that while
post states are independent portions of meaning (they are just states), this is not so for the
portion of meaning encoding actual property instantiation in the too- comparative struc-
ture. Too-comparatives always have to be interpreted with respect to a standard; special
means are necessary therefore to bring out the scope asymmetry in the too-comparative
structure.
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4.1 Eventives
Consider again the repetitive/restitutive pattern in the eventive case:
(24) a. ...weil
...because
wieder
again
einem
a
Warlord
warlord
Millionen
millions
in
in
die
the
Finger
f ngers
kamen
came
b. ...weil
...because
einem
a
Warlord
warlord
Millionen
millions
wieder
again
in
in
die
the
Finger
f ngers
kamen
came
‘...because a warlord got hold of millions again’
For (24-a) to be felicitous, there must have been an earlier event of a warlord getting hold
of millions. For (24-b) to be felicitous, it suff ces if a certain warlord had millions before.
The truth/felicity conditions for (24-b) are given in (25):
(25) ∃x (warlord(x)) & ET: AT(millions,locx,i’) &
LT: ¬AT(millions,locx,i) & AT(millions,locx,i’) & i < i’
In (25), the presupposition triggered bywieder is ET: AT(millions,locwarlord,i’),
the one triggered by the predicate is ¬AT(millions,locwarlord,i). Adding the lat-
ter presupposition to the presupposition triggered by wieder and furthermore quantifying
over warlords seperately at ET and LT, we have the representation of the repetitive read-
ing.
While the f rst reading one gets for (24-b) is indeed the restitutive one, a repetitive reading
appears available as well, especially if one plays with focus. Introducing negation helps
to single out the restitutive reading, though, cf. (26):
(26) ...weil
...because
keinem
no
Warlord
warlord
wieder
millions
Millionen
again
in
in
die
the
Finger
f ngers
kamen
came
‘...because no warlord got hold of millions again’
The reading that (26) gives rise to is just as the one in (25), except that we have a negative
existential quantif er now; there is no warlord such that he has millions after the event
that had millions earlier. Negation appears to prevent wieder from taking scope over the
cipient and hence from taking scope over the negated ‘thingatloc‘ meaning corresponding
to the pre-state that is accommodated/bound by the cipient.
4.2 Too- comparatives
It is helpful to consider the examples that follow within scenarios. Imagine that there
is a friendly contest between the German and the Palestinian national swimming teams.
The contest is held in Palestine/Israel for the second time, the teams are the same. Due
to circumstances, the water in the Palestinian pool is warmer than the German swimmers
are used to. The German coach has reason to be worried that this may be a disadvantage
for his team.
Under the f rst scenario, one of the German swimmers fails at the second contest. The
German coach comments apologetically:
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(27) a. Es
it
war
was
wieder
again
einem
a
Schwimmer
swimmer-DAT
das
the
Wasser
water
zu
too
warm
warm
b. Es
it
war
was
einem
a
Schwimmer
swimmer
wieder
again
das
the
Wasser
water
zu
too
warm
warm
‘A swimmer found the water too warm again’
Both comments presuppose that at the f rst contest, a swimmer failed as well; the differ-
ence between (27-a) and (27-b) is that there is a clear tendency to interpret (27-b) such that
it was in fact one and the same swimmer that failed at both contests; again, however, intu-
itions become somewhat elusive after some consideration, especially if the focus structure
is changed.
Under the second scenario, none of the German swimmers fails at the second contest. The
German coach comments triumphantly:
(28) a. Es
it
war
was
wieder
again
keinem
no
Schwimmer
swimmer-DAT
das
the
Wasser
water
zu
too
warm
warm
b. Es
it
war
was
keinem
no
Schwimmer
swimmer
wieder
again
das
the
Wasser
water
zu
too
warm
warm
‘No swimmer found the water too warm again’
The scope difference between (28-a) and (28-b) is clear: For (28-a) to be felicitous, it must
have been the case at both contests that there was no swimmer that found the water too
warm. In contrast, (28-b) is felicitous if at the f rst contest, there was in fact a swimmer
that found the water too warm (and hence failed). Let us look how this comes about.
As in (27-a), wieder has wide scope with respect to the cipient argument in (28-a). There-
fore, we get the reading sketched in (29):
(29) ET: ¬∃x (swimmer(x) ... & LT: ¬∃x (swimmer(x)...
In (28-b), the cipient has wide scope with respect to wieder; negation traps wieder be-
low the quantif er. Wieder therefore cannot take scope over the standard, itself a presup-
position (the negated thingatloc meaning) that is represented at the level of the cipient
argument. Since we are talking about one and the same individual, we can ‘pull out’
the propositional meaning def ning the cipient’s standard, that is, give it wide scope with
respect to both ET and LT (cf. discussion in section 3.2):
(30) ¬ ∃x (schwimmer(x)) &¬AT(water,degx,i)&ET: AT(water,degx,i)
& LT: AT(water,degx,i)
The translation of (28-b) says that there is no individual with a certain standard as regards
(acceptable) water temperature such that at an earlier (the presupposition) time and at a
later (the assertion time), the actual degree to which water temperature was experienced
exceeded the standard. (30) is however perfectly compatible with there being an individ-
ual that found the water too warm at an earlier time but not at a later time. In contrast to
(28-a), (28-b) does not exclude this situation.
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5 Summary
I have argued that an analysis of eventive and too comparative cipient constructions along
the lines of (31) can account for ‘repetitive/restitutive ambiguities’ familiar from the even-
tive domain but similarly arising in too- comparative constructions:
(31)
tP
NEG tP
XP
cipient
¬AT(theme,ground/much)
t
t PP/DegP
wieder PP/DegP
theme to(o) ground/much
AT(theme,ground/much)
In (31), the actually asserted meaning is encoded in the VP/AP; it says that there is some-
thing at a certain (degree) location, corresponding to the post state in the eventive case
and to the actual degree instantiation in the comparative case. The pre-state (event) and
standard (comparison) is represented at the level where the cipient is merged. If wieder is
prevented from taking scope over the cipient, it triggers a presupposition only correspond-
ing to the post-state and actual degree instantiation respectively. Negation as amalgamat-
ing with the cipient quantif er in German appears to create such an island for wieder.
In eventive structures, post-states are essentially independent portions of meaning. The
interpretation of too- comparative structures, in contrast, always involves reference to a
standard. It is for this reason that repetitive/restitutive asymmetries are harder to detect in
the latter case; it must be insured, in particular, that the cipient referent is the same in the
presupposition triggered by wieder and in the asserted meaning. Negation achieves this
and brings out the analogy.
More work is needed on distinguishing kinds of presuppositions and their interaction
with syntactic structure. A core feature of the analysis employed here is that syntactically
present argument expressions may act as accommodators/binders for presuppositions pro-
jected from predicates.
PATRICK BRANDT
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